I. Introduction
As a member of the Chambre during the July Monarchy, Tocqueville often reminded his fellow deputies that seeing new worlds prevents intellectual self-delusion and corrects political judgment. In Democracy in America, as well as in his parliamentary speeches and pamphlets, he drew heavily on the legitimacy conferred by "eye-witnessing."
1 Indeed, the authority of the first-hand, filtered through an acute intelligence and expressed with deceptively classical simplicity, became Tocqueville's writerly signature. There has been much controversy, however, about the extent to which Tocqueville saw America primarily through European lenses, and about whether he actually learned anything of importance there. It is one of the virtues of the Nolla critical edition of the Democracy, now made available to English readers, to show that viewing the United States first hand-its culture, society, politics, and predicaments-was decisive for the formation of his view of democracy as well as for his self-presentation as a truth-telling traveler.
2 "Seeing Africa" was to play an analogous role in Tocqueville's writing and political rhetoric. In his first letter on Algeria, written to bolster his parliamentary candidacy, Tocqueville notes that he has not been to Africa, though he is not so foolish as to boast of it. 3 After he had visited Algeria, he did not fail to exploit this privileged access in his speeches and reports ("if the Chamber will permit me to speak only of my own personal experience. . . I am profoundly convinced of the opposite"). 4 In this essay, I ask how we should evaluate Tocqueville's encounter with Africa within the context of his larger voyage into the territory of modern democracy. What were his justifications for the imperialist move into Africa? What lessons did he (and should we) draw out of this theoretical voyage?
II. Into Africa: Tocqueville's imperial voice
Compared to other nineteenth-century European imperial ventures, the French conquest of North Africa was relatively long, violent, and destructive. After displacing the Turks in 1830, France was at first unsure about how to consolidate her position. This indecision changed, however, with the emergence of significant resistance under Abd-elKader, a charismatic young religious and political leader who united Arab forces in the mid 1830s. Eventually the French decided to establish military dominance over the entire territory, a decision leading to a costly war that ended only in 1847. The struggle for control over Arab territory-the term of art began to be "pacification"-was entwined with an ambitious but "anarchical" policy of European colonization. 5 For many years, the war in North Africa appeared to be a matter of one step forward, two steps back. In 1840, however, Governor-General Thomas Bugeaud formalized the goal of total conquest and systematized the war's sporadically brutal tactics. Under his command, mobile columns of French troops deliberately ravaged all territory not under French control in order to prevent Arabs from sowing, harvesting, and grazing. 6 The aim of these successful razzia was to instill terror and destroy tribal cohesion by taking war to the civilian population in Arab villages. The predictable result was disease, famine, and eventual Arab disaffection from the war effort. 7 Beyond the use of razzia, Bugeaud defended controversial episodes of mass killings of civilians by
French officers as salutary episodes of terror that would hasten the end of the war. 8 In the seventeen years until conquest was attained, there was a high degree of self-consciousness among members of the French political class about the aims and conduct of this colonial war. In pamphlets and in the Chamber of Deputies they debated the potential value of any North African possession, the wisdom of colonization, the organization of the settler colony, the rationality of apparently ever-expanding military operations, the morality of French conduct of the war, the frightening "barbarism" of the enemy, and the nature of military/civilian relations in a democratic regime. Tocqueville was a keen participant in these debates.
A. Tocqueville and "la grande affaire d'Afrique"
Shortly after the dispatch of French troops to blockade (and eventually to seize) Algiers, Tocqueville discussed this expedition in letters to his brother Edouard. Like most of the French political class, he believed that the alleged trigger-the need to avenge a slight to the French envoy-was merely a cynical ploy by Charles X to shore up the Government's popularity before parliamentary elections. 9 More important for his subsequent defense of French policy in Africa, however, Tocqueville was struck by the tendency of this incident to mute petty partisanship. There was, he noted, "truly a national spirit in the way in which this question has reunited opinions." 10 13 Tocqueville traveled to Algeria for the first time in
May of 1841 as part of an official parliamentary group, and on his return wrote a substantial "Travail sur l'Algérie," concluding grimly that his former hope to fuse the two populations had been a chimera. 14 Now his focus was on the need to quell resistance as quickly as possible, on the morally dubious measures that were necessary for such a victory (a war in which "we burn harvests, . . . empty silos, and finally. . . seize unarmed men, women and children"), on the relationship between domination and colonization, and on the pressing challenges involved in implanting a successful European colony.
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It is clear from these writings that Tocqueville was a steadfast proponent of French emigration to Africa to create a settler society, and that by 1837 he was convinced of the need to control a substantial part of the territory (in contrast to limited or restrained occupation) in order to secure a zone of colonization. Both were contested policies among the center left groups in the Chamber with which he was loosely aligned. For the most part, he supported the Ministry on Algerian policy, even though he remained a sharp critic of its implementation. He supported Bugeaud's scorched earth policies as necessary to break the hold of Abd-al-Kader on the tribes and had by 1840 completely given up on any "quick, brilliant, honorable" end to the war.
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In a characteristic reach for a comparative perspective, Tocqueville began in the early 1840s to envision writing several articles on "the causes that produced and that sustain the astonishing greatness of the English in India." This subject was central, he wrote in a letter to Buloz, since "the crux of all great European affairs lies in Asia. This is particularly so for us now that we have the colony of Algeria." 17 The implicit contrast between successful Britain and struggling France, bogged down in a battle to pacify North Africa and regularize her rule, is clear in the organization of his reading notes on India and in the draft of the first part of this projected work. 18 Tocqueville gave his only major speech on Algeria in June of 1846, followed by a second three-month trip to Africa. As victory finally appeared imminent, and driven by the desire to "see and judge African affairs for myself," he toured Algeria from October to December 1846. 19 His study of the country during this trip, as well as the perspective on arcana imperii he had gained by his study of India, are reflected in the two long parliamentary reports that he wrote in 1847 as the rapporteur of a legislative committee on the organization of the peace and the future of the colony.
In what ways are Tocqueville's journeys into Africa analogous to those earlier trips to America, England, and Ireland that provided much of the raw material for is not surprising.
International imperatives
From his first speech in the Chamber (expressing outrage and even threatening war because of the pointed exclusion of France from the settlement of the eastern question) it was clear that Tocqueville believed that the primary goal of French foreign policy must be to reclaim her rightful position in Europe. The debacle of the revolutionary and imperial years had damaged France's standing among the great civilized nations. To play this role again she needed to project her power on a par with the other great nations, especially England. 27 Success in Algeria was key to this parity.
The great project of launching a civilized colony in Africa would help France reclaim her role as an equal arbiter of Europe's destiny. 28 Indeed, if France abandoned North Africa, then another civilized power would move into the vacuum and would reap any potential advantages in power and prestige. By the late 1830s Tocqueville is convinced that retreat would be ruinous. To withdraw from Africa would disgrace France and weaken her beyond repair in Europe, which would regard this action as "yielding to her own impotence and succumbing to her own lack of courage." 29 As Hugh Brogan has noted, this was the logic of Pericles: "'you now hold your empire down by force; it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.'" 30 The argument for French grandeur, however, was not merely a matter of national hubris. Tocqueville believed that
France had an obligation to assume the responsibilities of a great power, to set civilized norms, to arbitrate disputes, and to counteract the influence of other powers. Reestablishing the preeminence of France would indirectly promote the interests of Europe and the stability of the international system. 31 To abandon this duty was shameful.
Domestic drama
A second reason for persisting in Algeria was the impact of the French colonizing venture on domestic French politics, in particular the provision of a dramatic common focus and the diffusion of class rancor. Drawn into an imaginative vision that transcended petty self-interest, all citizens could find in this expansion into a new world a patriotic renewal of faith in la grande nation. Tocqueville, of course, believed that this capacity to subordinate personal interest to the good of the whole was the sine qua non of a free people. He was struck again and again by the ability of the English to sustain such crossclass cooperation and he saw a common pride in their Indian "possession" as an important ingredient in this mix. 32 Unlike some on the left, Tocqueville doubted that
France could successfully expand towards the Rhine, a foreign policy course that would cause Europe to close ranks against her. But the conquest and colonization of Algeria offered a glorious outlet. André Jardin has commented that Tocqueville saw the African venture as a way to unite the political class (le pays légal) with the rest of the country (le pays réel). 33 Projecting French power into the world indirectly built domestic bridges.
A civilizing mission?
A third potential argument justifying French domination over the Arabs and
Kabyles of North Africa, and European rule over "barbarous" countries in general, is the right and duty of the advanced to rule the backward in order to civilize them. All careful readers of Tocqueville have noted that he thoroughly rejected racial arguments for the inferiority of a people, but it is just as clear that he accepted cultural and historical ones.
He believed that peoples become enlightened at different rates, that enlightenment entails economic and social development, that development brings power, and that the power of civilized nations seduces the less civilized. These beliefs underlie Tocqueville's discussion of relations among European nations no less than his understanding of Europe's colonial diaspora. 34 And in these assumptions, Tocqueville reflected a widelyaccepted theory that all peoples pass through the stages of hunting/gathering, herding, and agriculture before arriving at civilization. Adopting contemporary usage,
Tocqueville often referred to hunter-gatherers as savage, while conflating pastoral and agricultural stages as barbaric or imperfectly civilized.
Tocqueville had no doubt that civilization definitively transformed the pattern of confrontation and conflict among nations by privileging the European powers. 35 But this belief in European superiority does not mean that he appealed to civilization as a defense of empire in anything like the strong manner used by English liberals or many of his French contemporaries. If a "civilizing mission" calls for the deliberate conversion of indigenous peoples to European civilization through education, missionary efforts, or state policy, with the aim of eventually transforming native law, custom, and religious practice, then in Tocqueville the call was faint.
In exploring the question of the ways in which Tocqueville saw the right and duty to civilize connected to European colonial rule, we first must take heed of a key distinction that runs through everything Tocqueville has to say about expansion into new worlds: the difference between domination (ruling a defeated population) and colonization (displacing or replacing a part or the whole of that population). 36 There can be domination without significant colonization (for example the case of Ottoman Algeria or British India); colonization without domination (if the territory is "empty," or if the indigenous population dies out or is exterminated, as sometimes happened in North America or the Caribbean); or a combination of domination and colonization (the French in Algeria). Tocqueville's civilizing rhetoric must be understood in relation to these different sorts of imperial expansion.
a. Domination tout court: Turks and Brits
Invasion and domination of one people by another is an old story. It is what the Turks did in Algeria, and Tocqueville sometimes uses the phrase "to rule in the manner of the Turks" as a short-hand for dominating another country successfully with the tacit consent of the conquered, a consent inferred by the lack of overt resistance. Indeed, he does not always use the phrase "in the manner of the Turks" in a pejorative way. It sometimes just means the shrewd and prudent administration of a foreign country (in one's own interest to be sure) by judiciously dividing and conquering and by conciliating key members of the defeated elites. But sometimes he does seem to condemn rule "in the manner of the Turks." Though they were not ineffective as conquerors, the Turks were too greedy and rapacious, a result of their own barbarism. For example they collected taxes from Arab and Berber indigènes to swell the coffers of the dey, without using those taxes to defray the expenses of governing the conquered territory, to maintain roads, or to dispense impartial justice.
The British, Tocqueville notes, ruled India in the manner of the Turks-albeit as kinder, gentler Turks-and it is just this achievement that he initially admires. In his projected work on India, Tocqueville intended to capture the attention of his readers by first puncturing the myth of the supposedly great British feat in conquering the subcontinent. On the contrary, he argues, the conquest was completely understandable
given the distraction of the French with revolution and war, the acquiescent nature of the major Indian religions, the indifference and self-sufficiency of Indian communes, the lack of Indian national feeling due to the caste system, the petty squabbling of Indian princes, and the familiarity of the Indians with rule by foreigners of another religion. Indeed, "the English were swept into domination of India by a current stronger than themselves."
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What needs to be explained is something quite different: the ability of the British to organize the conquest and to govern India, despite many initial injustices and scandals, despite policies that impoverished the population, and despite such potentially disastrous mistakes as importing the complicated forms of British justice. The eventual establishment of regular and moderate government, of civilian control that was superior to the military but not itself above the law, of rule over a large diverse empire that forsook the imposition of uniformity or centralization, and of functional coordination between the East India Company and the British state-these are the feats worthy of study.
Tocqueville is quite clear that these achievements fall far short of bringing civilization to India. Despite pious and self-justifying rhetoric-they claim to do everything out of principle, or for the "good of the indigenous people," or for the benefit of the very princes they are attempting to conquer-the British actually rule as milder and more skillful Turks. While they do use taxes raised from their subjects to defray the expenses of governing, they do nothing to revive the country, for example by building public works. "So far the English have ruled over India for themselves and not for her." 38 Moreover, according to Tocqueville, while Indian social structures were slowly beginning to weaken, the Indians gave no sign of wishing to adopt European civilization or religion. He writes in a marginal note that India cannot be civilized while she retains her religion, and a religion "of this kind" is so tightly mixed with the social state, morals, and laws that it is impossible to destroy, maintaining its hold even after people have ceased to believe in it. To civilize one must break into this "vicious circle," a daunting and dangerous business. were imitated by Abd-el-Kader, who probably did no more than transfer the privilege from one set of hands to another. Why don't we do the same thing?
[emphases added] 40 Tocqueville assumes that for a very long time France will rule over the Arab indigènes in North Africa as "better" Turks. 41 I take up a more detailed discussion of his view of the fate of the indigènes below.
b. Colonization
The demands of civilized conquest-that is, acting as better Turks-appear in
Tocqueville's writings to be more arduous than awe-inspiring. France was struggling, he admitted in 1841, even to do as well as the "barbarous" Turks or the Arabs, whose actions could sometimes be construed as more civilized than those of the French. Indeed, the French have created a bureaucratic nightmare worse than anything found in France itself.
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In his second "Letter on Algeria," Tocqueville had argued that the alleged decline of the religious motive and the rise of material interest among indigenous peoples were among the most hopeful signs for their joining the French in a new civilization. 48 In the 1840s, when he had abandoned his earlier belief in these signs, he champions the cause of the economic colonists against the military, who manifest an imbecilic irritation with the colonists' desire to make money. 49 From a limited military point of view, Tocqueville admired French warriors in Africa, but he also believed that they "take on distorted proportions in the public imagination" and that their influence in the colony should be restricted. 50 It is not the exploits of citizen soldiers like Cincinnatus that capture his imagination, but rather the "heroic" creation of a commercial "Cincinnati transported onto the soil of Africa." exposing his own resources or counting on himself alone, he rarely displays that ardor, tenacity, and intelligence that make capital productive." The objective is not to benefit economic interests in France (in the short term those interests may even suffer) but to create a vital economic and civic society peopled by colonists with "ardor, tenacity, and intelligence" who make both capital productive and (eventually) local civic life possible.
Tocqueville's hope is that the state can create the conditions for this new society: civil and economic freedoms that will reinforce each other to create an invigorated character, "free, passionate and energetic. 53 Against much evidence and against all odds, he hoped that a new colonial venture-less like the old French empire in Canada and Louisiana and more like the vigorous English colonies in America-might create an inspiring monument to the glory of the French. 54 Some characterizations of Tocqueville's analysis of the sources of vitality in American democracy overstate the extent to which he thought civic energy flowed from public to private life, rather than in the other direction. 55 In Tocqueville's America, we should remember, the qualities of independence and self-reliance needed for success in commerce tend to carry over into political life. 56 Good business requires steadiness, practical shrewdness, farsightedness, the ability to calculate risk, and a determination to beat the odds. So too does free politics. The trick is to create a structure in which these contrasts what an ordinary citizen could expect in France-above all guaranteed property rights, settled civil law, independent magistrates, and some influence on events-with the horror of their absence in the Algerian colony. How, he despaired, could France attract rational economic immigrants to such a "miserably anarchic" place? 57 Tocqueville's embrace of economic civil society in Africa is all the more surprising in that the self-governing aspects of such a democratic society are muted.
While he hopes that civil and political freedoms will eventually flourish in Algeriaindeed, without collective interests and actions there will be no "society"-he condones short-term restrictions on the press, a system of advisory councils that are appointed rather than elected, and tight control over all relations with the indigenes: 'the electoral system, freedom of the press, the jury. These institutions are not necessary for the infancy of societies." 58 Tempering his enthusiasm for the potential future of the settler colony was the sober recognition that it was being formed amidst a sea of Arab enmity, and was populated by flawed immigrants whose passions could not be allowed free reign. The metropole had to police the fragile borders between two peoples, isolate the Europeans from the simmering resentment and hatred of the indigènes, and protect the natives from the aggression and intolerance of the settlers.
B. Les anciens habitants de l'Algérie
In his "First Report on Algeria," written on the eve of victory, Tocqueville speaks about the obligation of the French to govern the "old inhabitants of Algeria" with decency, that is, to provide "a power that guides them, not only toward our interest, but in theirs. . . that works ardently for the continual development of their imperfect society . . . that does not restrict itself to exploiting them." 59 But, Tocqueville admits, these sentiments are aspirations: statements of what ought to be "the permanent tendency and the general spirit of our government." 60 When he turns to concrete details of French policy, even in this public report attempting to reassure its readers that France will of course act with humanity and justice, the true difficulty of maintaining a balance between "our interest" and "theirs" emerges.
A public agenda for Algeria
The problem of acquiring territory for European settlement-not just any territory, but "the most fertile, best-irrigated, best-prepared lands"-was perhaps the most difficult policy issue facing the French. 61 Stubbornly attached to the American analogy, Tocqueville argues that Algeria was sparsely settled by peoples who, if not true nomads,
were still "mobile" and had not developed settled agriculture. Thus there was room for
French settlement. 62 Although he warns against "deceitful or derisory transactions" (the clear reference here is to the Americans' duplicitous treatment of the Indians), against confiscation without indemnity, and against expulsion from the land, he still thinks it is possible to gain access to land "either in concessions of rights, or in an exchange of lands." 63 He is referring here to the practice that he had mentioned in his letter to
Lamoricière, that is, inviting Arabs to cede lands to the French state that they did not "need," in exchange for recognition of their individual or collective ownership of lands it allowed them to keep. Known as "cantonnement" (delimitation), such a policy was in fact pursued by the French and was deeply resented by the Arabs as unjust. In practice it rapidly did turn into a policy of "refoulement" (expulsion from territory), helping to reopen an era of insurrection in 1859, the year of Tocqueville's death. 64 A second issue was how to make the goal of "working ardently for their development" more than empty rhetoric in a society structured around inequality. At the very least Tocqueville thought the French needed to address the damage they had done to Arab society. He recommends a modest rebuilding of the Muslim educational and charitable institutions, but warns against going too far in that direction. 65 Next the French must abstain from interfering in Muslim religious institutions or civil law, which would dishonor the peace they had made with the indigènes. Tocqueville foresaw the creation of a permanently segregated society, and was opposed even to admitting young Arabs to French schools, since it would be "as dangerous as it would be useless to seek to suggest to them our mores, our ideas, our customs." 66 Indigenous society, then, should be pushed only in the "direction proper to it." By this phrase, Tocqueville seems to mean that any voluntary movement toward European notions of individual property and labor should be encouraged, and that Arabs should be able to sell their labor to Europeans. "The European needs the Arab to make his lands valuable; the Arab needs the European to obtain a high salary." 67 It is hard to see how this "community of interests" (a sort of internal guest worker policy) could be expected to reconcile the Arabs to the French presence, especially since it was combined with exclusion from the political community.
Tocqueville is quite clear that the Arabs were to be governed from above, that is, would be granted no civil guarantees beyond the provisions of Muslim civil law and no political rights. He thought it would be suicidal for the French to forget that the Arabs' war-like nature and legitimate grievances made them a formidable potential military threat; the Arab indigènes must be ruled by what amounted to a law of exception, and subject to summary imprisonment or exile. 68 The Kabyles (Berbers) posed a different problem. Settled agricultural peoples ensconced in mountain areas and fervently attached to the soil, they could be brought within the French orbit by a hands-off policy. One certainly shouldn't try to civilize them.
In a dig at philanthropic civilizers, he noted that if you traveled to a Kabyle village to "speak about morality, civilization, fine arts, political economy, or philosophy," "they would assuredly cut off your head." 69 The Kabyles were not a threat to French colonization, as long as their lands weren't confiscated or directly attacked. Tocqueville always vehemently opposed expeditions into Berber territories, which he thought foolish and unnecessary. If not attacked, the Kabyles would be peaceful trade partners and would accept living in the dominant orbit of the French as they had accepted the hegemony of the Turks.
Private doubts
The dreaded example of American crimes against the Amerindians-expulsion and extermination-was frequently invoked in French debates about relations with the North African indigènes. In both public and private, Tocqueville strenuously denied that he or the French government had any such intentions, and there is no reason to doubt his sincerity. Nevertheless, Tocqueville thought that a very likely effect of prolonged contact between the "civilized" French and the "barbarous" Arabs would be to demoralize and dispirit the latter through no one's explicit intention. 70 In his Essay on Algeria, never intended for publication in its unrevised state, he notes that those who have been to
Algeria "know that this state of things seems to become more so every day, and that nothing can be done against it. The Arab element is becoming more and more isolated, and little by little, it is dissolving. The Muslim population always seems to be shrinking, while the Christian population is always growing." 71 Tocqueville's version of "lifting [the Arabs] in our arms toward well-being and enlightenment," then, seems restricted to allowing them to live in well-policed proximity to European commercial civilization, a contact from which he hoped rather vaguely that they would eventually profit, but which he believed was much more likely to produce demoralization and democratic decline.
In 1846 What is the "more" that the British should have done? Their task was "not only to dominate India, but to civilize it. These two things, indeed, are closely connected." 82 Tocqueville seems to be calling here for a form of domination that will gradually provide Indians access to economic opportunity. At the very least the exploitative East India
Company, which deliberately ruined native industries and put its own commercial interests above the well-being of Indian subjects, should be replaced by direct rule under the eye of Parliament and the public. He writes to Ampère that the rebellion shows that
England must not only reconquer India, but govern in a new way. 83 Tocqueville's correspondence with Reeve suggests that the new direction in British rule should focus on building an infrastructure of public works (roads, canals, and bridges) that will allow the country to become more self-sustaining and prosperous, with Indians eventually sharing in this development. Or, as he says to Lord Hatherton, "as the [British] government tends more and more to apply the general principles that make Europe rich and enlightened, it will little by little make the Indians feel the advantages of our civilization and will bring them closer to it." 84 There is still, then, little taste for robust civilizing in the sense of transforming, educating, and moralizing a "backward" people.
IV. Conclusion
Placing Tocqueville in the political landscape he inhabited allows us to understand why he succumbed to the temptation to ignore the claims of "imperfectly- 
